A study is reported which assessed the reactions of automobile travelers to potential gasoline rationing and pricing situations which are projected to occur if the 1980 standby motor fuel rationing plan is implemented. 
This type of assessment appears to be widely supported by government officials and politicians and increasingly recognized by the general public. In the past, federal reaction to energy shortfalls has taken the form of a variety of ad hoc, spontaneous, and uncoordinated actions, owing to the lack of a coordinated energy plan for dealing with such contingencies. The lack of conformity in responding to a shortfall caused uncertainty among drivers, and this uncertainty had the effect of magnifying the impact of shortfalls on inhibiting travel.
In 1980 the President and the Congress finally agreed upon a motor fuel rationing plan. The perceived value of this standby motor fuel rationing plan is that it injects more certainty into a highly unstable environment as well as offering a relatively equitable solution to the problem. The study reported here was concerned with assessing the reactions of automobile travelers to potential rationing and pricing situations that are projected to occur when the standby rationing plan is implemented.
The automobile travel industry in the United States consists of a wide variety of disparate types of businesses. When all these businesses are aggregated and considered as a total industry, the size of that industry makes it one of the largest in the United States. In 1979, American travelers spent $126 billion on trips to places 100 miles or more from home. Over 83% of this travel was by automobile. This is considerably more than Americans spent for clothing, for the purchase of automobiles, or for national defense. In fact, the only items in the family budget that exceeded the spending for travel were food, housing, and income taxes. 2 The travel industry supports about 5 3. The modal group size for three of the segments was two, but 44% of those traveling on business were traveling alone which was the mode in that segment. 4 . The planning horizon of business travelers was shortest (67 % planned their trip less than two weeks ahead of time). The modal trip planning period for pleasure vacationers and the vacation/visiting segments was one to three months. Like business respondents, those visiting friends and relatives reported a mode of less than two weeks, indicating relatively little trip planning was undertaken.
5. Eighty-eight percent of the total sample were on a trip in excess of 100 miles and there were no significant differences between these respondents and those traveling on trips of less than 100 miles.
6. The main difference between the four segments in the one-day distance traveled from home to the primary destination was the farthest distance traveled by the vacation/visiting segment (40% of this group were on a trip of over 1,000 miles and a further 27% on a 501-1,000 mile trip).
These characteristics illustrate the wide representation from many subsegments included within the total sample, suggesting that the study offers reactions to gasoline rationing and price increases from a wide crosssection of automobile travelers.
ANALYSIS Respondent Reactions to Price Increases
Respondents in each of the four primary market Figure 1 and summarized in isting surplus equipment capacity to absorb only between 2 and 5 % of long-distance automobile travelers, while combined bus and rail spare capacity could absorb only 1%.&dquo; Hence, it might reasonably be concluded that the determining factor in curtailing long distance travel, given severe gasoline price increases or rationing, will not be consumer unwillingness to shift modes, but rather the lack of available alternate mass transit to transport them.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
There are some limitations to the study which should be recognized when interpreting the data. First, the magnitude of reductions shown may not be fully realized because shorter trips may be substituted for the present trip which was the focus of this study. Similarly, respondents were asked to react to the scenarios under the assumption that they would use the same vehicle in which they were currently traveling. Some vehicle substitution may occur through respondents using smaller vehicles which would enable them to continue to make the same trip.
A second limitation, which again may have led to some exaggeration of the impact of rationing, resulted from offering respondents mutually independent pricing and rationing scenarios. Some respondents may not be constrained by rationing to the extent they indicated since they could take advantage of the white market and buy more gallons from that source. However, this gasoline is likely to cost an additional $1.60 per gallon and, given the relatively small proportion of respondents who indicated they would make their trip if a $1.25 price increase were imposed, this potential limitation seems likely to have only marginal impact.
There is some evidence which suggests that the sociodemographic profiles of visitors to highway welcome centers differ from those of all automobile travelers.14 However, a reasonably varied sociodemographic and trip behavior cross-section of the population was represented in this study. Further, biases in the distribution of these groups were not of primary concern since the focus was on exploring differences in reaction among market segments rather than on the distribution of those segments in the automobile population. 
